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Abstract From 1900 onwards, scientists and novel-
ists have explored the contours of a future society
based on the use of ‘‘anthropotechnologies’’ (tech-
niques applicable to human beings for the purpose of
performance enhancement ranging from training and
education to genome-based biotechnologies). Gradu-
ally but steadily, the technologies involved migrated
from (science) ﬁction into scholarly publications, and
from ‘‘utopia’’ (or ‘‘dystopia’’) into science. Building
on seminal ideas borrowed from Nietzsche, Peter
Sloterdijk has outlined the challenges inherent in this
development. Since time immemorial, and at least
since the days of Plato’s Academy, human beings
have been interested in possibilities for (physical or
mental) performance enhancement. We are constantly
trying to improve ourselves, both collectively and
individually, for better or for worse. At present,
however, new genomics-based technologies are open-
ing up new avenues for self-amelioration. Develop-
ments in research facilities using animal models may
to a certain extent be seen as expeditions into our own
future. Are we able to address the bioethical and
biopolitical issues awaiting us? After analyzing and
assessing Sloterdijk’s views, attention will shift to a
concrete domain of application, namely sport genom-
ics. For various reasons, top athletes are likely to play
the role of genomics pioneers by using personalized
genomics information to adjust diet, life-style, train-
ing schedules and doping intake to the strengths and
weaknesses of their personalized genome information.
Thus, sport genomics may be regarded as a test bed
where the contours of genomics-based self-manage-
ment are tried out.
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Begin at the beginning
‘‘I shall begin at the beginning’’, said the DHC
[Director of Hatcheries and Conditioning], and
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tions in their notebooks: Begin at the beginning.
‘‘These’’, he waved his hand, ‘‘are the incuba-
tors.’’ And in opening an insulated door he
showed them racks upon racks of numbered
test-tubes. ‘‘The week’s supply of ova. Kept’’, he
explained, ‘‘at blood heat; whereas the male
gametes’’, and here he opened another door,
‘‘they have to be kept at thirty-ﬁve instead of
thirty-seven’’. Still leaning against the incuba-
tors he gave them … a brief description of the
modern fertilizing process; spoke ﬁrst, of
course, of its surgical introduction – ‘‘the
operation undergone voluntarily for the good
of Society, not to mention the fact that it carries
a bonus amounting to six months’ salary…’’
etc. (Huxley 1932/1947, p. 9).
This quotation was taken from the famous opening
chapter of Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New
World (1947) in which literary tools are used for an
exploration of the future. Huxley did not write his
novel in a vacuum, ex nihilo, of course. On the
contrary, it was a contribution to an already existing
stream of literature that had begun to emerge around
1900 and consisted of publications written predomi-
nantly by authors who were scientist, novelists, or
both. Gradually but steadily, the ideas addressed in
these writings migrated from novels, plays and stories
into scientiﬁc publications. Indeed, in the course of
the 20th century, there was a steady trek of such ideas
from utopia (or dystopia)t oscience, to borrow a
famous title from the writings of Friedrich Engels
(1880/1976). What Engels outlined with regard to
socialism, applies to bioscience as well: due to the
initial immaturity of scientiﬁc developments, the
visions involved, envisioning an ‘‘ideal’’ science-
driven society (as alluring as they were uncanny),
were more a matter of foresight and ﬁction than
reality. They were idealistic and even naı ¨ve, and
condemned to producing utopian (or dystopian)
views—utopian or dystopian depending on the
(technophilic or technophobic) denomination of the
reader. And the more these views were ﬂeshed out in
detail, the more their phantasmatic nature became
apparent. Yet, in the course of the century, this clearly
changed. In 1978 Louise Brown, the ﬁrst IVF child
was born, an important milestone for reproductive
biomedicine, but also an example of science ﬁction
becoming reality, or utopia becoming science. In
public media, this ‘‘test-tube’’ baby was emphatically
presented as a perfectly normal and healthy child. Yet
a technique that was initially directed towards repro-
ducing normalcy, could in principle provide a window
for modiﬁcation and enhancement as well.
Finally,thecenturythatbeganwithMendelandLoeb
resulted in a famous Press Conference (June 26 2000)
where President Bill Clinton, together with Francis
Collins and Craig Venter, formally announced that the
human genome sequencing effort was nearing its
completion, opening-up a plethora of potential uses of
human genomics information in various ﬁelds. The
press conference amounted to something of a science
show, the penultimate movement in a technoscientiﬁc
strip-tease, for in reality nature still strived to conceal
herself even then,as Herakleitos had already stated: the
Consortium had to continue its sequencing efforts for
another 4 years to come before the Human Genome
Project could really be considered ‘‘completed’’.
The question I intend to address in this article is
how we are to assess the bioethical and biopolitical
challenges these developments entail for health
management by individuals and society, for personal
as well as for public health. There is a widespread
conviction that, as scientiﬁc research is moving into
new terrain, philosophical and bioethical discourses
are challenged to adapt themselves to the novel
circumstances thus emerging. Massive, technology-
driven research efforts, directed at producing stag-
gering amounts of bioinformation, are bound to raise
new issues that reanimate the philosophical and
bioethical paradigms of the recent past. But what do
these challenges amount to and what would be
needed in order to address them in adequate ways?
The article will start with a short historical
retrospect concerning the maturation of utopian ideas
into scientiﬁc research practices as outlined above,
focussing on literary writings by Wells, Huxley and
(ﬁnally) Houellebecq. Building on this concise his-
torical review of ﬁction and forecast, I will then
address the question what kind of future is awaiting
us, what kind of utopia (or dystopia) is implied in
contemporary genomics science as it is currently
emerging, and what this entails for the conceptual
frameworks and methods of biophilosophers and
bioethicists. In order to address this question, I will
ﬁrst of all reﬂect on recent writings of the German
philosopher Peter Sloterdijk and, to a lesser extent, on
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123those of Michel Foucault. Notably in his provocative
lecture ‘‘Rules for the human park’’ (1999/2001),
Sloterdijk deliberates precisely on this type of issue
by announcing the emergence of what he refers to as
a new wave of ‘‘anthropotechnologies’’, technologies
that pervade our ‘‘essence’’ (notably our genome and
our brain) and the question will be how we are to
assess them in terms of ‘‘biopower’’ and ‘‘practices of
the Self’’. Subsequently, in order to move from a
panoramic and philosophical to a more concrete and
bioethical level, I will focus on two particular ﬁelds
of application where the implications of genomics for
biomanagement are now beginning to present them-
selves and that therefore constitute important stage
settings for exploring the future uses of genomics and
bioinformation, namely the professional sports
domain and the animal husbandry domain.
The Beginning: The Year 1900
The year 1900 has been regarded as a quantum leap
in the history of science, a kind of Cambrian
Explosion of novel ideas. In the realm of the
humanities, Freud launched the psychoanalytical
movement with his Interpretation of Dreams and
Husserl launched the phenomenological movement
with his Logical Investigations. The sense of rupture
was even more acute in the scientiﬁc realm, with the
introduction of the quantum concept by Planck
(thereby launching quantum physics), the introduc-
tion of the mutation concept by De Vries, the
discovery of blood types by Landsteiner and (of
course) the rediscovery of the work of Mendel. All of
a sudden, the basic conviction proliferated among
scientists working in various ﬁelds (like an intellec-
tual epidemic) that nature does make leaps (natura
facit saltus) and that characteristics of entities depend
on the presence or absence of discrete elements, be it
elementary particles, antigens or genes. This convic-
tion was at odds with the idea, dominant throughout
the 19th Century, that nature progresses through
accumulations of inﬁnitesimal changes. Darwin for
example was so thoroughly convinced of this that he
explicitly stated on no less than seven occasions in
The origin of species that nature does not make leaps
(natura non facit saltus).
In that same period, around the year 1900, biologist
Jacques Loeb (1899/1905) put forward the idea that
biology should give way to biotechnology. Organisms
can be manipulated by adding certain chemical
substances to their environments. He discovered for
instance that, by manipulating their external milieu,
‘‘artiﬁcial parthenogenesis’’ (non-sexual reproduc-
tion) could be induced insea urchins and he concluded
that, in principle, artiﬁcial reproduction in ‘‘mam-
mals’’ (that is: humans) would be possible as well. In
the textbook The science of life (1931/1938), written
by H.G. Wells (the science ﬁction writer who also was
a prominent biologist) in collaboration with his son
and with Julian Huxley (brother of Aldous), Loeb’s
ideas were discussed in an anticipatory manner: ‘‘In
mammals (again: this should be read as humans) the
ovum is inaccessible to the experimenter, so that we
do not know whether artiﬁcial parthenogenesis is
possible. There is no reason to suppose that it is
not…’’ (1931/1938, p. 509). From here, Loeb’s
seminal biotechnological ideas made their way to
the ﬁrst chapter of Aldous Huxley’s novel, which
contains clear references to Loeb’s experimental
work. Basically, Loeb claimed that nature (including
the human body) should be regarded as raw material
for future biotechnologists to work with. Biologists
should become bio-engineers, focussed on improving
rather than on understanding nature (Pauly 1987).
Huxley’s novel basically seems to suggest that at a
certain point, reproduction (biologically speaking our
most important ‘‘assignment’’ in life) cannot be left
to individuals (or rather, to couples). Sooner or later,
the modern nation-state has to assume its responsi-
bility, has to begin to govern this process in a more
rationalistic, scientiﬁc, post-fatalistic and evidence-
based manner, in order to assure the physical and
mental well-being and quality of life of the general
population and of future generations through top-
down family planning. Thus, Huxley’s novel is a
literary exploration of what Foucault (1976) and his
followers have analysed in terms of biopolitics and
biopower. In Huxley’s novel, the state is seen as an
immense biological plant, a giant hatchery for
producing high-quality human beings, a modern,
scientiﬁc version of Plato’s science-based ‘‘ideal’’
state. Therefore, his novel is a modern counterpart of
Plato’s Republic, where the same proposition is put
forward. In order to signiﬁcantly enhance the
performance of the city-state, the guardians will
have to seize control over reproduction, training and
education.
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123The foresight genre, of which Brave New World
constituted one of the highlights, was not an exclu-
sively Western phenomenon. A similar discourse
emerged simultaneously in the Soviet Union. Here, as
in the West, utopian/dystopian ideas were vigorously
explored in stories and essays concerning the artiﬁcial
production of a new type of human beings, happy and
productive, adapted to technology-driven social envi-
ronments. And here as well, the replacement of
natural (sexual) reproduction by artiﬁcial reproduc-
tion and parthenogenesis in the context of hatchery-
like facilities constituted a crucial ingredient (Groys
and Hagemeister 2005).
As far as Western sources are concerned, there is a
clear ‘‘genealogical’’ connection, via Loeb, from
Wells to Huxley. Besides authoring science ﬁction
novels, H.G. Wells also published biological treatises
and essays. In 1902, he published an article in Nature
entitled The discovery of the future in which ‘‘two
types of mind’’ were distinguished. The ﬁrst and
dominant type, he argued, is retrospective in habit and
committed to learning from the past. The second type,
however, is oriented towards the future. Whereas the
former (‘‘legal’’) type is ‘‘submissive’’, believing that
what has been acknowledged in the past should also
guide us through the present, the second (‘‘scientiﬁc’’)
type is creative and masterful and oriented towards
change. This type of mind sees contemporary society
as a workshop, and the present as no more than
material for the future. Given the fact that science and
technology have come to play such an important role
in contemporary society, Wells argued, much more
can be learned from exploring the future (through
anticipations and extrapolations) than from exploring
the past. Yet, it is still the past that dominates our lives
and thoughts. Whereas sophisticated methods have
been developed for carefully analyzing past events
(history, archaeology, palaeontology, etc.), the explo-
ration of the future has so far been left to novelists.
Due to science, we have been able to produce a fairly
clear picture of what life must have been like in the
Roman era, or even in swamps and jungle forests of
the Mesozoic age, for instance, but for some reason
we keep underestimating our possibilities for produc-
ing visions of the future with a similar degree of
accuracy. Knowledge of the future is attainable,
however, Wells argues—and well worth attaining.
The century that began with Planck’s quantum
concept, Mendel’s rediscovered paper, Loeb’s
experiments and Wells’ summons to produce more
foresight research, ended more or less with Michel
Houellebecq’s novel Elementary particles (1998). In
this novel, literary extrapolations of our genomics
future are combined with critical reﬂections on
previous utopian projects and revolutions, as well as
on Huxley’s dystopian novel. In Houellebecq’s book,
the 20th century, notably the 1960s and 1970s, are
presented as a series of revolutions or mass exper-
iments. In critical and cynical terms the author
reﬂects on the philosophical, political, sexual, cul-
tural, technical and psycho-pharmaceutical experi-
ments of past decades. All these revolutions, the
author argues, resulted in ﬁasco’s. Take for instance
the philosophical revolution as it notably emerged in
contemporary French philosophy. As Houellebecq
points out, it ended with Deleuze committing suicide,
Lacan becoming senile and Foucault falling victim to
the consequences of his sexual experiments. Along
similar lines, the other revolutions are ‘‘discussed’’
and discarded. The sexual revolution, he argues,
resulted in pointless, meaningless sex, acted out not
only in novels and movies but also in real life, the
life-world of individuals, disconnected from procre-
ation, and wholly devoid of love and attachment. The
psycho-pharmaceutical revolution resulted in self-
destructive and irresponsible behaviour, fake experi-
ences and malaise—and so on, and so on. Now,
however, a new revolution has announced itself, that
will ﬁnally succeed in delivering what the other failed
to deliver, namely human happiness—although this
apparently optimistic message should no doubt be
interpreted in an ironic vein as well.
The main character of the novel, a scientist,
managed to produce the algorithm that will allow us
to reconstruct and optimize our genome, the essence
of what we are. Thus, a new type of human beings can
ﬁnally be produced, in order to replace the existing
(unhappy) type. More or less at the same moment, in
1999, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk pub-
lished his essay Regeln fu ¨r den Menschenpark
[‘‘Rules for the human park’’], that later became
embedded as a chapter in an important volume on
Heidegger (Sloterdijk 1999/2001), in which similar
ideas are ﬂeshed out. In his lecture, Sloterdijk presents
a provocative view on the history and possible future
of humankind. Human beings, he argues, are to a
considerable extent self-made. Building on seminal
Nietzschean ideas, he presents human history as a
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Until recently, Sloterdijk argues, humanistic strategies
have been tremendously important in this respect,
notably through the emergence of literacy: the ability
to read, write and exchange letters and books, thus
enhancing the pace of communication, life and
history, while opening up avenues for communication
and ‘‘epistolary friendship’’ even between individuals
belonging to different historical periods. Reading and
writing are seen by Sloterdijk as techniques or
practices of the Self, to use the Foucauldian term, as
‘‘anthropotechnologies’’, allowing us to create new
cultural environments and to adapt ourselves to our
self-made socio-cultural world through education.
Through practices such as literacy, we became what
we essentially are, or believe ourselves to be, namely
autonomous, rational and responsible individuals.
However, in the near future, Sloterdijk argues,
these humanistic strategies may no longer sufﬁce to
intensify the process of self-ediﬁcation. At a certain
point, biotechnologies may be put to use as ‘‘anthro-
potechnologies’’ in order to open-up new possibilities
in this direction—as was also suggested in Houelle-
becq’s novel. But what exactly does Sloterdijk mean
by that? In the next section, I want to analyse his
ideas, that caused something of a scandal at their time
of publication, in more detail.
Anthropogenesis: The Coming into Being
of Human Beings
In order to explore the contours of a future ‘‘human
park’’, Sloterdijk’s lecture begins at the beginning,
with an updated philosophical vision of our early pre-
historic past. Building on ideas articulated by Nietz-
sche he argues that, unlike other domesticated
animals, human beings more or less domesticated
themselves, thus occupying both the subject and the
object pole of the domestication process—we have
been both our shepherd and our herd. According to
Sloterdijk, philosophers until now have consistently
failed to acknowledge and consider the pivotal role of
self-domestication in the process of anthropogenesis
(the coming into being of humankind).
Notably the Neolithic revolution (the introduction
of agriculture) was crucially important. Since then,
we became sedentary beings who created an artiﬁcial
ecosystem, a socio-cultural sphere of our own, a kind
of incubator or hatching facility where animals were
domesticated, plants were cultivated, individuals
were educated and stories were exchanged—trans-
mitted from one generation to the next. Our philo-
sophical blind spot, according to Sloterdijk, has
always been the extent to which our own early history
is intimately connected with the history of (other)
species we actively domesticated. Our view of history
has always been ‘‘humanistic’’ and therefore biased in
the sense of being overtly anthropocentric.
This view, articulated by Sloterdijk in 1999, shortly
before the theatrical unveiling of the human genome
sequence, is conﬁrmed by contemporary genomics
research as it has evolved since then. Until recently,
human history was basically seen as a single-species
narrative. Genomics, however, allows us to recon-
struct our history in ecocentric terms, as a history of
artiﬁcial ecosystems, where humans and other species
(domesticated animals, cultivated plants, microbes
involved in fermentation and the like) cohabitate and
co-evolve. The genomes of the rice plant, or the
potato, or the domesticated cow constitute bioarchives
in which we ﬁnd our own history reﬂected. While
dramatically changing our domesticated animals and
cultivated plants, we have simultaneously changed
ourselves, by transforming our environment and
thereby altering the course of our socio-cultural
trajectories. We have drastically changed the condi-
tions of our own evolution, our own history. Humanity
as we now know it, is the outcome, the ‘‘product’’ of a
development that can be reconstructed in a much more
detailed manner than ever before due to the bioar-
chives made available by sequencing the genomes of
the species involved.
From this perspective it becomes clear that bio-
technology, in a broad sense of the term, covering any
technological application using living organisms, has
played a pivotal role in human history during the past
ten millennia or so. Biotechnology in a more contem-
porary and narrow sense, however, namely in the form
of technologies that allow us to transform and modify
the genomes of species more directly, through genetic
engineering and similar techniques, is likely to play a
no less pivotal role in determining our future. Besides
allowing us to reconstruct important chapters of early
human history in a much more detailed manner than
ever before, genomics and genome-related biotech-
nologies may also provide us with new opportunities
for continuing this history in new directions, through
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that may redeﬁne what we are and what we may
become. This development is bound to pose unprec-
edented challenges to philosophy, completely reset-
ting biopolitical and bioethical agendas. According to
Sloterdijk, the question is whether philosophy (still
dominated by the humanistic convictions of the past)
isreadyforthesechallenges.Yet,inordertoassess the
present and explore the future, we must begin at the
beginning. How did we become the type of human
beings we currently are in the ﬁrst place?
The process of anthropogenesis, Sloterdijk argues,
is intimately connected with processes of domestica-
tion and self-domestication. The house (domus in
Latin) must be regarded as a ‘‘biopolitical complex’’
(p. 322) that set the stage for the process of anthropo-
genesistotakeplace. Besidestaming‘‘other’’animals,
we also managed to tame ourselves, the animal
‘‘within’’. This involved training, but also other
domestication techniques such as selection (through
uneven prospectsforreproduction).This‘‘bottom-up’’
and time-consuming process—bottom-up in the sense
that in took place in houses and villages rather than
through political institutions—resulted in a particular
typeofhumanbeing.In‘‘humanistic’’accountsofhow
we came to be what we are, this virtually unexplored
pre-history of self-domestication is often ‘‘repressed’’,
ignored or eclipsed.
Another important chapter in the history of
anthropogenesis was the emergence of literacy. Slot-
erdijk describes how in the context of the Roman
Empire the art of writing opened-up practices of the
Self that allowed individuals to distance themselves
from the ‘‘mass media’’ of the day, notably amphi-
theatres, where spectators were entertained with
spectacular and atrocious shows. The reading and
writing of letters and books allowed ‘‘friends of the
alphabet’’ to develop a much more humane, less
boisterous counter-culture. And this literacy-based
counter-culture of epistolary networks for exchange
between like-minded friends involved Stoics like
Seneca as it did Christians like Saint Paul.
According to Sloterdijk, it is obvious that literacy
presupposes self-domestication. Only people who
inhabit a house (be it a roman villa, a monastery or
a bourgeois mansion) are able to (learn to) write and
read. All the typical attributes of literacy, of reading
and writing (a chair, a table, a library, etc.), as well as
related activities (such as walking or having a
conversation in a garden) presuppose the existence
of a house that may contain letters and books. Even a
church is basically a house built for the purpose of
reading (one particular) book. And the same goes, of
course, for schools. A school is a house that is
basically constructed for the purpose of learning to
read (and perhaps also to write) books—similar to the
way in which universities are premises where indi-
viduals learn to read and write scholarly papers. Until
recently, moreover, schools were erected for the
purpose of learning to read particular types of book,
notably books that were part of the national cultural
canon, written in a more or less artiﬁcial national
language that tended to differ from the various verbal
dialects spoken at home or in the local village. Thus,
literacy not only involved the introduction of new
tools for self-enhancement (the acquisition of new
communicative skills), but also a replacement and re-
contextualisation of the process of ‘‘producing’’ and
shaping human beings, from homes and hamlets to
novel types of buildings, directed towards discipline
and control. This also resulted in new forms of
selection. The individuals (pupils) involved in these
school-type practices could well be regarded as
objects and targets, rather than as subjects of the
process.
According to Sloterdijk, however, we are now
entering an era in which new possibilities for selection
and self-enhancement present themselves, for
instance in the form of pre-natal selection, in the
context of IVF. Increasingly, and contrary to what was
suggested in Huxley’s novel Brave New World, this
process is individual-driven, rather than state-driven,
and will allow individuals to occupy the ‘‘subject’’
rather than the object pole of the process. They
themselves are the ones that will be increasingly
exposed to a proliferation of technology-based oppor-
tunities for reproductive choice. This is not by
deﬁnition a pleasant situation, far from it. According
to Sloterdijk, contemporary human beings clearly
display a profound uneasiness towards these new
possibilities for exerting biopower, and rightly so, for
these possibilities seem much more powerful and
consequential than the ones we have been able to
sufﬁciently familiarised ourselves with in the past (p.
328). Yet, according to Sloterdijk, instead of deciding
to refuse to use these new possibilities for biopower at
all—which may well be our ﬁrst impulse, but also a
dead alley and a form of escapism -, we rather should
160 H. Zwart
123face the challenge of formulating a new codex for the
use of emerging anthropotechnologies (p. 329).
Whether and to what extent these new anthropotech-
nologies will bring about a dramatic change of human
phenotypes and genotypes, through a conscious shift
from reproduction ‘‘fatalism’’ to genomics-based
selection, may still be an open question as yet, but
should nonetheless become a major issue of concern.
As Kant already indicated, it is typical for human
beings to be confronted with question they seem
neither able to resolve nor to ignore, and the issues
raised by newly emerging anthropologies clearly
seem to fall under this heading.
At the same time, Sloterdijk reminds his readers of
the fact that such issues are not completely without
precedent. In a number of dialogues, notably Politi-
kes, Plato already deliberates on issues involved in
the management and amelioration of humankind. In
Plato’s view, the ancient polis emerges as a kind of
human park, where enlightened aristocrats see it as
their responsibility to govern human reproduction in a
rational manner for the beneﬁt of the state. Thus, the
polis emerges as a kind of hatchery where human
beings are produced—an ancient precursor of Hux-
ley’s Brave New World. According to Sloterdijk, the
question is not whether we will decide to use
emerging anthropotechnologies such as prenatal
selection or gene therapy in the future—there can
be no doubt that we will—but rather how we are to
organize their use in such a way that human
individuals may become the ‘‘subjects’’ rather than
the ‘‘objects’’ of the process, the authors rather than
the targets of these emerging bioexperiments.
A similar perspective has been voiced by Michel
Foucault in 1976, when the notion of biopower was
introduced by him, and once again in 1984 with the
introduction of the notion of the ‘‘care for the Self’’.
In 1976, he explored how, in the 19th century, nation
states began to take an interest in (or rather, to
develop serious concerns regarding) the physical
well-being of their populations, notably of the lower
social strata. These concerns were driven by the
consideration that the physical well-being of the
masses (in terms of health care, food, housing,
hygiene, etc.) constituted a major factor of economic
and military importance. Various biopolicies were
designed for the purpose of monitoring and improv-
ing the physical condition of large numbers of people.
Thus emerged the concept of public health. From this
perspective, individuals were the objects or targets,
rather the authors or initiators, of biopolitics. In 1984,
however, a different perspective was opened-up.
Now, Foucault became interested in the practices
individuals themselves may engage in to shape and
manage their own life and care for their own body
and health. Like Sloterijk, Foucault indicates that this
should not be seen in terms of an Either/Or: to
domesticate or to be domesticated. This was rather
the way in which the issue was framed by Plato,
building on a dichotomy, a basic distinction between
two types of human beings, namely aristocrats and
slaves, those who can and those who cannot reason-
ably be granted the responsibility to care for them-
selves as well as for others. According to Plato, this
dichotomy represented a ‘‘natural’’ distinction,
almost amounting to a demarcation between two
different subspecies. In the view of authors such as
Nietzsche, Foucault and Sloterdijk, however, things
are much more complicated. Domestication of others
and of ourselves are processes that are complemen-
tary and closely connected. In various situations
individuals may occupy various positions. Both
biopolitics and care for the Self, both domestication
and Self-domestication constitute pivotal dimensions
or axes of the pastoral complex. We cannot ‘‘decide’’
whether to domesticate or be domesticated, to be
disciplined or to manage our own life, as we are
always involved in both processes. Rather, the
question is how to assume the subject-position as
consciously as possible. In the face of newly emerg-
ing biotechnologies, how can we really position
ourselves in such as way that we will be able to
inﬂuence and govern our own future, both as
individuals and as societies? According to Sloterdijk,
the humanistic response, a discourse that basically
rejects the newly emerging anthropotechnologies as
being at odds with and as constituting a threat to
human ‘‘dignity’’, can no longer be expected to
provide us with viable answers. The ‘‘post-human’’
response rather argues that our ‘‘dignity’’ resides in
the fact that we can be, and often have been, in a
position that allows us to form and reform ourselves,
with the help of a broad range of techniques, from
reading and writing letters and diaries up to prenatal
diagnostics. Our ‘‘essence’’ resides in our ability to
shape, manage and transform ourselves. We have
never been satisﬁed with ourselves, we have always
kept working on ourselves, always interested in
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is no reason to suppose that we will stop doing so in
the future.
Anthropotechnologies: Ancient and Emerging
Ten years after the publication of his human park
essay, Sloterdijk (2009) published an important sequel
in which the history of anthropotechnologies is
ﬂeshed out from an individual (or ethical) rather than
from a political perspective. The history of human-
kind is seen as a history of emerging practices of self-
improvement. Since time immemorial, human beings
have been pushing performance boundaries through
spiritual, mental and physical exercises. An important
chapter in this history is the Renaissance of the
professional athlete and the resurge of the ancient
stadium (the modern arena) around 1900. The inau-
guration of the ﬁrst Olympic Games (Athens 1896,
Paris 1900, etc.) exempliﬁed the breakthrough of the
neo-Olympic movement, the neo-athletic syndrome.
Since then, top sport has emerged as a practice of
continuous self-improvement and enhancement
through anthropotechnologies (training schedules,
diets, special techniques, dexterity of movement,
respiratory regimes, high-altitude training, etc.).
Again, Sloterdijk develops his diagnosis of the present
through a series of ﬂash-backs to important begin-
nings. And once again, a major point of departure,
also for the history of anthropotechnologies, is Plato’s
Academy, a training site devoted to athletics and
philosophy, to physical and mental gymnastics, as
well as to trainer-athlete interaction.
Building on Sloterdijk’s diagnosis I would argue
that the basic objective of Plato’s anthropotechnolo-
gies or practices of the Self is already ﬂeshed out in
his famous simile of the cave, a staging that in many
respects seems to have served as model or archetype
for Huxley’s opening passage cited above:
Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean
cavern… Conceive them as having their legs
and necks fettered from childhood, so that they
remain in the same sport, able to look forward
only, and prevented by the fetters from turning
their heads… etc. (Plato 1935/2000, 514).
At a certain point, some of these hyper-domesticated
human beings are freed from their chains. They are
literally ‘‘educated’’, that is: they begin to move
upwards, towards the light. This, however, is a painful
and time-consuming process, involving training and
exercise, for instance training of the sense organs.
Moreover, once the individuals involved are sufﬁ-
ciently enlightened, they will ﬁnd it impossible to
return to their former positions. Plato’s uncannyand at
ﬁrst instance rather bizarre scene reads like a Paleo-
lithic hatching facility for producing human beings, a
Flintstone-like version of Huxley’s biotechnological
assembly line. These prisoners may also be seen as
human cattle, subject to practices of human ‘‘hus-
bandry’’. Their very position is similar to that of
domesticated animals in contemporary bio-industry.
As such, the simile seems to indicate that, as a purely
biological entity, human beings are still far from
ﬁnished, far from human. Therefore, they are to be
subjected to anthropotechnologies in the form of
training schedules and educational modules. Only a
select number of them will become intellectual top
athletes bound to greatly surpass untrained (fettered)
human beings in terms of physical or intellectual
performance. In Plato’s days, this miracle of self-
improvement and self-enhancement was performed
through training (paideia) alone. Perhaps that now,
new types of anthropotechnologies may allow us to
pushourphysicaland mentalboundaries even further?
Bioinformation and Enhancement
Philosophers, novelists and other masters of the
imagination have used their art to explore their way
into our present and future. Genomics, notably the
sequencingofthehumangenome,initiallyonageneral
(‘‘species’’) level, and now increasingly in an individ-
ual level as well (allowing future citizens to consider
the strengths and weaknesses of their own genetic
constitution through personalised genomics informa-
tion), in combination with proliferating biotechnolo-
gies, allow us in principle to use this information in
order to (continue to) enhance ourselves. The question
how we are to use this new type of biopower can no
longer be ignored. Are we about to make another
signiﬁcant leap in the history of self-formation?
It seems predictable that genomics-based bioin-
formation will increasingly affect the ways in which
we (as individuals and as societies) will manage our
individual and public health. Initially, the focus will
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notably for purposes of prevention, through adapting
our life-style (food, environment, therapy, career
choice, etc.) to the information provided by sequenc-
ing genomes. This will also involve various forms of
training: we will have to learn to interpret this type of
data into meaningful options and choices. The next
step, somewhat more futuristic perhaps, but nonethe-
less already explored in various contexts such as
animal laboratories not wholly unlike Plato’s cave in
terms of spatial organisation, will consist of devel-
oping technologies that will allow us to actively
inﬂuence our organism, our genome, on the basis of
genomics information. For instance, modiﬁed viral
genomes may be introduced in human bodies in order
to produce certain tissues or certain neurotransmitters
in a tailored and targeted manner to counteract the
effects of ageing or degenerative disorders. Those
who distance themselves from such scenarios under
the pretence that they seem ﬁctitious and unrealistic,
are apparently ignorant of the extent to which such
research trajectories are already designed and con-
ducted in laboratories worldwide exactly for this
purpose, using animal models. Bioethics and biopol-
itics cannot afford to put themselves consciously
behind schedule by closing their eyes for these
developments. Rather, we should train ourselves in a
new style of ethical thinking, designed in close
proximity and interaction with experts involved in
these technoscientiﬁc developments, in order to
address the opportunities and dilemma’s they entail.
In contrast to what Huxley suggested in his novel,
I do not ﬁnd it all that plausible that future
generations will begin their life in a test-tube as
mass-produced individuals in a centralised hatching
facility. What is much more likely, however, and no
more than an extrapolation of already existing and
established research practices, is that somewhere in
the near future, say 2020 or so, at the beginning of
their life, individuals will be taken by their parents to
a genomics facility where, in the form of a heel-prick
test, their personal genome will be sequenced. The
sequence thus acquired can be used for public health
research, but will also be available and downloadable
for the individuals involved, stored in the form of
giant databases, or by their physicians at their
request, for whatever purpose (dietary reasons, health
problems, career choice, buying a house, reproduc-
tive choices, and so on). There will be avant-gardes
of course, pioneer groups such as patient suffering
from life-threatening diseases, risk groups, special
professions or top athletes, who will resort to such
practices somewhat earlier than others. Top athletes
for instance will be interested in adapting their
training schedules and food intake, or even their use
of doping products, to the idiosyncracies of their
personal genome. For various reasons, the use of
genomics bioinformation by athletes constitutes a
kind of experimental setting, a laboratory that
provides a preview of practices that are bound to
spread (as a kind of technological epidemic) to other
contexts as well, at a somewhat later stage. Therefore,
sport genomics offers a fascinating case study for
exploring the imminent future of public health. In the
two ﬁnal sections I intend to further explore these
issues with the help of top athletics as a special ﬁle
that builds on two ‘‘beginnings’’ already outlined
above, namely Plato’s simile of the cave (symbolis-
ing what has been called the emergence of human
thinking and of classical intellectual and athletic
ideals around 500 B.C.) and the emergence of neo-
athleticism around 1900.
Top Athletes as Pioneers of the Genomics Era
The combination of genomics with high level sport
activities has already aroused much attention and
debate. One of the scenarios is that in the near future
‘‘normal’’ sport professionals will increasingly have
to compete with ‘‘genetically modiﬁed super-ath-
letes’’ and that the Olympics of the future will
increasingly be dominated by the latter (Miah 2004).
A second scenario emphasises the role of ‘‘gene
doping’’, i.e. the non-therapeutic use of cells, genes,
genetic elements, or the modulation of gene expres-
sion, having the capacity to improve athletic perfor-
mance (idem). A third scenario rather focuses on the
use of genomics information in the context of
training. In this scenario, the future Olympics will
be dominated by genetically ‘‘normal’’ (that is,
unmodiﬁed) athletes working in close collaboration
with (teams of) experts and trainers who know how to
make use of new types of genomics information in
the context of diets, training programs and nutritional
supplements (‘nutriceuticals’). Thus, existing anthro-
potechnologies will not become outdated and
replaced, but rather ampliﬁed and complemented by
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of scenario’s is also possible, where ‘‘gene doping’’
regimes are tailored to individualised genomics
information and vice versa.
So far, a substantial part of the discussion on
genomics and top sport has either focussed on genetic
manipulation and gene doping, or on the use of
genomics information in the context of prevention
(Jordan 1998). In the ﬁrst case, the debate addresses
issues involved in the production of ‘‘super’’ athletes
through conscious manipulation of human genomes
and human bodies. Technologically speaking, possi-
bilities in this direction will remain quite limited for
the years to come, so that there is a substantial element
of science ﬁction and utopia (or dystopia) in these
debates: they constitute reﬂections on thought exper-
iments rather than on on-going developments. As
Sloterdijk (2009) phrases it, genetic manipulation may
remain a mere anecdote in the annals of athleticism.
Nonetheless, research with animals shows that
genomes can be transformed dramatically and that
physical characteristics of mammals (such as bodily
weight and muscular strength) are certainly open to
manipulation. The question remains, however, to what
extent these laboratory ﬁndings can and will be
extrapolated to human subjects, given both the
biological and the ethical restrictions in this area. So
far at least, transgenic animals did not, as the statues
of ancient Greek sculpture once did, arouse potential
athletes to mimic and follow their examples.
When it comes to prevention strategies, genomics
information, notably the presence of particular genes
associated with increased risk for health problems
such as heart disease or Alzheimer, could be used to
preclude carriers of ‘‘risk genes’’ from entering
particular sports, notably on a high performance
professional level, such as professional soccer or
boxing. Although these debates are interesting in
themselves, a perhaps even more relevant impact of
genomics on elite sport (proliferating from there to
other practices) will evolve in a somewhat different
direction in the sense that genomics information will
be increasingly used to improve training and food
regimes by tailoring parameters such as diet and
climate (optimal training latitude and altitude) to
personalised genomics information.
Increasingly it will become possible for genomics
information to become ‘‘personalised’’. Although it
may take some years to complete an affordable
personal whole-genome sequence (the famous $1.000
genome), SNP-arrays allowing the detection of
relevant polymorphisms and variation throughout
the whole genome are becoming increasingly afford-
able for individuals, and this will notably apply to top
athletes. The top athlete and his or her trainer
constitute a team that is on the look-out for novel
forms of information. Continuous innovation in terms
of technique, training programmes and dexterity
improvement makes and accounts for the (often
slight) differences. There is no doubt that the further
development of this scenario has the potential of
revolutionizing professional sport as we now know it.
By providing top athletes and their trainers and
physicians with individualised genomics information,
it will become increasingly possible for them to adapt
life-style, nutritional diet and training programmes,
but also doping intake, to the strengths and weak-
nesses indicated by the personalized genomics pro-
ﬁle. Interventions may become more targeted and
tailor made. Gradually the focus will shift moreover
from damage repair to prevention of harm and, on the
conceptual level, from focussing on the presence or
absence of single genes associated with particular
characteristics (a monogenetic approach), to whole-
genome association studies (a genuinely genomics
approach). Rather than promoting one ideal diet or
training method for all athletes, highly individualised
schedules will be developed on the basis of persona-
lised genomics information.
Top Athletes as ‘‘Laboratory Animals’’
or ‘‘Athlete Husbandry’’
The basic morale of Plato’s simile of the cave can be
formulatedasfollows:duetotraining andeducationas
anthropotechnologies, human beings ﬁnd themselves
midwayonajourneybetweentwopoles,namelyonthe
one hand the pole of the self-domesticated, self-
subjugated animal leading a slave-like existence, and
on the other hand the pole of the top athlete (be it in an
intellectual, physical or artistic sense) leading a life of
asceticism, exercise and top level performance. This
may also be reframed in a somewhat different manner:
we human beings constitute the mean between two
extremes, or rather two types of animals that mirror or
exemplify the two human poles outlined above,
namely the domesticated animal on the one hand and
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of outpost into our own future, a highly transparent
body whose physiological and genomic make-up is
documented and controlled in an extremely detailed
and precise way. Ter Gast (2007) has indicated how
laboratory mice, inhabiting the research facilities of
the present in astounding numbers, leading their cave-
likeexistenceinhigh-tech environments,mayactually
be regarded as ‘‘biotech pioneers’’ exploring and
already entering our own human future. Not only
because they are inﬂicted with the disorders from
which we ourselves are bound to suffer somewhere in
the future, and subsequently subjected to the treat-
mentsthatweourselveswillbesubjectedtooncethose
treatments are regarded as safe enough (and we
ourselves are regarded as ill enough) to do so. An
animal laboratory is like a theatre where possible
personal futures are acted out. Not only in terms of
therapy and disease, but also in terms of enhancement.
To put it bluntly: what works in mice, may sooner or
later be offered to humans. Whoever visits an animal
research facility may well cite what the American
journalist Joseph Lincoln Steffens phrased after his
visit to the Soviet Union in the heydays of technosci-
entiﬁc utopiareferredtoabove:‘‘Ihave seen thefuture
and it works’’ (Kaplan 1974). What we are currently
doing to mice in terms of size, muscular strength and
longevity may well mirror some of the practices that
will emerge inhuman health policiesofthe future. Not
in the sense that we ourselves will come to inhabit
assembly line, Brave New World facilities, but in the
sense that particular elements of these research trajec-
tories may well become embedded in biomedical
therapy, prevention and enhancement trajectories of
the future. We cannot discard such a development
simply by saying that it would be at odds with human
dignity,asthiswouldignoretheusualmigrationroutes
ofknowledgeclaimsandtheirbiomedicalapplications
from animal laboratories into hospitals and training
sites or top sport facilities for humans.
But when it comes to exploring our own future, we
may as well start from the other side of the spectrum,
namely animal husbandry genomics or livestock
genomics.
1 Here, genomic sequencing information
is used to tailor food and housing regimes to the
genomes of the livestock involved in order to achieve
an optimal ﬁt between genome and environment as
well as for identiﬁcation, monitoring and surveillance
of farm animals or herds. Animal corporeality is
‘‘translated’’ into bioinformation (Harvey 2007). This
information may be used to enhance selection and
reproduction policies. This may further the produc-
tion of top performers and ‘‘farmyard supermodels’’
(Harvey 2007, p. 15), but genome information may
also be used to reduce phosphate excretion by
tailoring food regimes to genomic proﬁles. As is
indicated in Plato’s simile, the difference between
human and non-human domesticated animals is that,
whereas the fettered animals are merely the passive
objects and targets of such technologies, human
beings (released from their chains) may decide to use
this type of information for performance enhance-
ment on their own accord, although, as Plato
explains, an element of coercion is bound to be
present in the early stages of this process. In this
manner, genome illiteracy gives way to the embed-
ding of bioinformation in training and life-style
regimes of top performers such as professional
athletes. Thus, in the human context, in the context
of top level sport it is imaginable that individuals
themselves, in collaboration with coaches and health
experts, will increasingly use personalised genomics
information in order to develop optimal diets, career
choices and other life-style decisions. Or, to use
another example, the 21st century will not be a Brave
New World where ‘super employees’ will be artiﬁcially
produced by means of genetic modiﬁcation. What is
much more likely is that in the near future, various
possibilities for pre-employment genetic screening
(PEGS) will affect the course of professional careers
in the sense that individuals themselves will tailor
their diets and career decisions, as well as the
design of their working environment, to personalised
information concerning their relative strengths and
weaknesses as reﬂected by their genomes (Holzman
2003).
Thus, top athletes may be regarded as a kind of
avant-garde, as pioneers leading the way into the
future of public health genomics, where more and
more opportunities for using personalised genomics
information, as well as for translating this informa-
tion into concrete life-style options for individuals,
may present themselves. Thus, reﬂections on the
ways in which the availability of genome information
affects top sport is not only of interest for the athletes
1 http://lgu.umd.edu/lgu_v2/homepages/home.cfm?trackID=
2715
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of genomics information may spread from limited
groups (top athletes, patients, risk groups, special
professions) to the broader society of ‘‘ordinary’’
citizens (the research subject of an epidemiology of
technology).
In 2007, Nature Genetics published a question of
the year on its website, allowing experts from various
backgrounds to explicitly consider possibilities for
using personalised genomics information in the
future. The discourse thus emerging could be
regarded as an ‘‘ethical’’ laboratory, where future
issues are explored by well-informed individuals in
an interactive manner, responding to one another.
Besides (and in combination with) academic desk
analysis, the normal trade of philosophers and
ethicists, and besides (and in combination with)
literary explorations of genomics futures by profes-
sional novelists and science writers, such podiums
provide an interesting source of complementary input
for our effort to map the societal future of genomics.
On June 26 2000, Clinton, Collins and Venter
presented the human genome sequence as a kind of
map. Like the Lewis & Clark map, to which the
human genome map was explicitly compared, it was
a physical map, indicated rivers, mountains and
various other physical elements as exactly as possible,
providing the necessary input for a rather con-
sequential emerging practice: the colonisation of
the American West. Today, the challenge will be to
present a social-geographical map, indicating in
various domains and regions how human genomics
information is used, or bound to be used, and what
infrastructures are emerging that may allow us to
govern this process in such a manner that individuals
may position themselves as the subjects, rather than
as the objects, as the performers rather than the
targets, of this consequential development.
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